Another sober panel at the American Enterprise Institute:
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It gets better when you read the description:

The U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will expire on December 5 and with it the only mechanism in place between the United States and Russia for verification of compliance with strategic arms control commitments. Hopes faded long ago for having a new treaty negotiated and ratified in time to prevent a lapse in arms control verification. Instead, both sides declared that they hope to have a new treaty signed (but not ratified) by December 5. Furthermore, President Barack Obama has clearly indicated that he is eager to sign a new treaty before he accepts the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on December 10. The United States’ enthusiasm for a deal has substantially enhanced Russia’s bargaining position in the short term. Will the Obama administration’s rush to conclude a new treaty result in unwarranted concessions? Will the negotiations contribute to a “reset” of U.S. relations with Russia, or will they give rise to new tensions? How will the new treaty address U.S. concerns that Russia has violated important provisions of the original treaty? And what is the relevance of this new treaty, as well as Obama’s broader vision of a “world without nuclear weapons,” to U.S. and international efforts to constrain nuclear weapons proliferation to Iran, North Korea, and other countries?

They may wish to revisit some of these premises. Even if Obama really is desperate to get a treaty in place by Oslo, the odds that it will amount to unilateral nuclear disarmament are between zero and some new probabilistic figure that mathematicians have yet to invent that denotes “are you fucking kidding me.”

Spencer Ackerman

Spencer Ackerman